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Summary  
The CDM to date has been the most successful 
mechanism to support mitigation activities in
developing countries. One of its core concepts 
is that activities must demonstrate their addi-
tionality, i.e. that they represent emission re-
ductions beyond a given baseline scenario to 
ensure the environmental integrity of the Kyoto 
system. 
Within the climate finance domain, the term
‘additionality’ has developed a fundamentally
different meaning. Climate finance is to be ad-
ditional to existing sources of (development) 
finance. Thus, additionality in this case does not 
directly apply to fundable activities, but to the 
finance donors. Both concepts have in common 
that additionality points to the seriousness of 
an effort, be it the level of funding in the latter, 
or the level of emission reductions in the former 
case. 
Many have hoped that the CDM’s additionality, 
if applied to the wider climate finance domain,
can contribute to standardizing the funding cri-
teria. In this paper, we therefore explore op-
tions of applying the CDM's to do just that. We
highlight issues of environmental system integ-
rity and efficient allocation of funding, and dis-
cuss potential limits of the CDM's additionality 
concept in its current form, if applied to climate 
finance in a system that does not have as well-
defined borders as the zero-sum-game of trad-
able emission reductions under a capped envi-
ronment which makes the clear attribution of 
emission reductions almost impossible. We
propose some inroutes to adapting the current 
approach to additionality in this context, and 
pose a number of questions that can help to 
further discuss and refine the CDM's additional-
ity concept to make it better applicable for a fu-
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1 Introduction  
Significantly higher ambition is needed to 
combat climate change and its already irre-
versible effects – current practice has simply
not sufficed to reverse the climatic trend. This 
has consequences for the development of pro-
grammes and projects, but also for financial
support: calling for a higher level of ambition in 
developing countries means that levels of fund-
ing need to shift to higher ambition levels as 
well.  
In Copenhagen, developed countries agreed to 
provide USD 100 billion of climate finance an-
nually from 2020 onwards. Not all of this money 
will come from public funds, and it is also dedi-
cated to both mitigating climate change and 
adapting to its adverse effects. While at first 
sight the pledged amount appears to be an 
enormous sum, it quickly comes apparent that 
the available funds will be only a drop in the 
bucket of what is actually needed: The New 
Climate Economy Report (2014) estimates 
global investments in infrastructure in the 
world’s urban, land-use and energy systems to 
amount to USD 6 trillion annually over the next 
15 years. In order to “climate proof” these in-
vestments, i.e. choosing low-carbon alterna-
tives wherever possible, per year an estimated 
additional USD 270 billion will be necessary 
(New Climate Economy 2014).
In other words, the amount of money available 
to support mitigation activities in developing 
countries and the amount that is needed to 
cover the cost of low-carbon infrastructure in-
vestments differ by an order of magnitude. 
Public climate finance will remain extremely 
scarce. It is therefore of utmost importance to 
allocate the available funding as efficiently as 
possible.
However, this efficiency can be interpreted in 
various ways. In a strict sense, one could argue 
that it is best to focus on those projects where 
reducing emissions is cheap, to purchase as 
many emission reductions as possible with the 
available money. Alternatively, one could priori-
tize those kinds of mitigation activities that 
promise to leverage large amounts of addition-
al private money so as to maximize the total 
money available for low-carbon investments. A 
third option is to invest strategically in activities 
that promise to be actual game changers if fully
developed. If it is possible to demonstrate the 
viability of certain more sustainable practices, 
they may become attractive in and off them-
selves and would not require support through 
public climate finance in the future. The idea of 
this last-mentioned approach would be to 
choose funded projects on the basis of their 
transformative potential, i.e. their ability to shift 
what currently is business-as-usual.  
The CDM to date has been the most successful 
mechanism to support mitigation activities in
developing countries. It has been particularly 
successful with respect to the first two aspects 
mentioned above. Through the CDM, a series of 
extremely low cost mitigation activities have 
been identified. Some of them, especially in-
dustrial gas projects, are so cheap that they 
rightly have been accused of windfall profits,
and efforts have been made to find alternative 
ways to regulate these emissions more effec-
tively outside the global carbon market. The 
CDM has also been extremely successful in lev-
eraging private investments. The UNFCCC Sec-
retariat estimated total investments to have 
reached USD 215 billion by June 2012. (UNFCCC 
2012).
However, not all mitigation potentials are ame-
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For example, CDM projects in the transport sec-
tor have hardly been put forward. The reason is 
that a large number of decentralized GHG 
sources are much more difficult to monitor than 
large point sources. Projects that focus on edu-
cation or long-term shifts in urban infrastruc-
ture are equally difficult to fit into the form of a 
CDM project because it is often difficult to une-
quivocally establish a direct causal relationship 
between the project activity and the activity 
that causes the emissions. 
Furthermore, the demand for CERs originates 
predominantly from the mitigation commit-
ments of Annex I countries. For the current 
commitments, this source of demand is already 
saturated, and future commitments will most 
likely not reach levels that are nearly in the 
range of what is necessary to limit global warm-
ing to below 2°C.
Nevertheless, there are numerous lessons to be 
learned from the CDM that can inform and 
guide the development of an efficient and ef-
fective climate finance regime. In this policy 
brief we will focus on one particular aspect of
the CDM: the additionality concept. CDM pro-
ponents must demonstrate that the project 
would not occur without the support of the 
mechanism. This provision is seen as central to
the environmental integrity of the mechanism.
It ensures that only those projects are credited 
that represent real emission reductions.
In section 2 we will give a brief review of the 
additionality concept contrasting the CDM ap-
proach with the often confused concept of 
“new and additional” climate finance, i.e. the 
demand for funding in the form of grants or 
loans that complement rather than substitute 
existing funding in the context of international
development cooperation. In section 3 we will 
lay out the differences in the scope and pur-
pose of the CDM vs. wider climate finance in-
struments and discuss whether or not these dif-
ferences have implications for the applicability 
of the CDM’s additionality concept in the cli-
mate finance domain. Section 4 will discuss the 
limits of the additionality concept, paying par-
ticular attention to its implications on the ob-
jective transformative change that has been 
promulgated by various climate finance in-
struments such as the Green Climate Fund or 
the NAMA Facility (supported by Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and the European 
Commission). Section 5 concludes.
It is important to note that this policy brief does 
not set out to give a final answer to the ques-
tions raised above. Instead it lays out the chal-
lenges, identify and specify the need for further 
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2 Additionality – A Brief Re-
view of the Concept
The term “additionality” is an ambiguous one,
especially when it comes to climate finance. To 
avoid  confusion, we will briefly review and con-
trast the varying concepts of additionality. 
2.1 Additionality of Finance 
The call for "new and additional" climate fi-
nance is rooted in basic provisions of the UN-
FCCC (Article 4.3). It has been made more con-
crete in the Copenhagen Accord in 2009, when 
developed countries committed to a fast-start 
financing period between 2010 and 2012,
providing USD 30 billion to developing coun-
tries, and a long-term goal of jointly mobilising
USD 100 billion annually from 2020 onwards. 
The funding provided was to be "new and addi-
tional" in so far as it was to exceed previous cli-
mate financing levels, and additional to existing 
development finance.
However, a clear-cut definition of climate fi-
nance additionality has never been achieved.
The term has always been politically contested, 
and employed with varying degrees of strin-
gency by different countries and country 
groupings under the climate regime.
One of the underlying problems that make the 
additionality term complicated to grasp is the 
lack of distinction between development and 
climate finance, as they share both scope and 
recipients. It is therefore often highly difficult to 
establish where development finance ends, and 
where climate finance begins.
There have been various options to find a defi-
nition of additionality of climate finance. At the 
heart of these options is always an attempt to 
define a funding baseline against which the 
level of additional finance can be compared. 
In the fast-start finance context, many devel-
oped countries have resorted to using the 2009 
level of climate funding (as reported e.g. within
the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System, CRS)
as a baseline against which rising levels of fi-
nance can be measured. However, this does en-
tail the risk that funding is diverted from exist-
ing finance instead of actually raising the 
foreign aid budget (Brown et al. 2010; Vieweg 
et al. 2012).
A compelling option would be to simply count 
any and all finance as additional that exceeds 
the internationally-agreed commitment of de-
veloped countries to provide 0.7% GNI as de-
velopment finance. While this could at least 
partly solve the problem of funding overlaps 
between development and climate finance 
while also avoiding the danger of shifting funds 
from development in order to meet a climate 
finance target, many developed countries will 
object to such a definition, as most of them cur-
rently do not reach the committed level of de-
velopment finance. 
2.2 Additionality of Mitigation 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the additionality 
concept has been introduced in the context of 
the flexible mechanisms CDM and JI. Annex I 
countries, i.e. countries that have taken up 
binding quantified emission limitation and re-
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the additionality determination procedure as laid out in the ‘Tool for the
demonstration and assessment of additionality’. Source: CDM Executive Board 2012.
reductions for the purpose of meeting their ob- emission reductions under JI it is at the discre-
ligations from projects that provide a reduction tion of the host party of the project to verify the 
in emissions or an enhancement of removals by additionality of the credited activity. The ra-
sinks, that is “additional to any that would oth- tionale behind this decentralized approach is
erwise occur” (UNFCCC 1997, Art. 6 §1(b) and the following: any Emission Reduction Unit
Art. 12 §5(c)). (ERU) issued to a project activity would reduce 
the amount of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) These requirements were elaborated on and 
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mitigation obligation. Under the assumption 
that parties will eventually make full use of their 
assigned amount, the issuance of ERUs there-
fore does not increase the overall emissions of 
Annex I countries. If AAUs are scarce and com-
pliance is uncertain, host countries will perceive 
the issuance of ERUs as an significant economic
risk. In this case, Shishlov et al. have argued, “[...] 
additionality becomes more a matter of economic
efficiency than environmental integrity” (Shish-
lov, Bellasen & Leguet 2012, p. 1). 
The case is different for additionality in the 
CDM. In contrast to the ERUs generated under 
JI, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from
the CDM, originating from developing coun-
tries that are not subject to binding emission 
reduction obligations, do increase the amount 
of emissions that industrialized countries are 
allowed to emit under the restrictions of their 
mitigation commitments. CERs that do not re-
flect real emission reductions would inflate the 
emissions cap of industrialized countries and 
therefore threaten the environmental integrity 
not only of the CDM but of the entire Kyoto Pro-
tocol.  
The additionality concept within the CDM is at 
the centre of determining whether or not a 
proposed project does, in fact, promise actual
emission reductions. Building on the Marrakech 
Accords, the CDM Executive Board has elabo-
rated an extensive regulatory framework for the 
determination of additionality. For individual
projects, the ‘Tool for the demonstration and 
assessment of additionality’ provides a stepwise 
approach (CDM Executive Board 2012). Accord-
ing to this tool, a proposed CDM project can be 
considered additional if it is a) the first of its 
kind in a given host country, b) financially not 
viable or less attractive than more emission in-
tensive alternatives AND the proposed project 
activity is not common practice in the coun-
try/region, or c) the project faces other barriers 
to implementation that may be overcome with 
the help of revenues from the sale of CERs AND 
the proposed project activity is not common 
practice. Figure 1 illustrates this stepwise ap-
proach.
More recently, the CDM Executive Board has 
been tasked to develop more standardized ap-
proaches for the demonstration of additionali-
ty. With the introduction of the Standardized 
Baselines, it is now possible to develop a base-
line scenario and derive a positive list of tech-
nologies, fuels or feedstocks that are deemed 
automatically additional with a standardized 
approach based on the performance of the var-
ious technologies that produce the output of 
the sector and their respective market penetra-
tion rate (CDM Executive Board 2011).  
Despite these efforts, the additionality concept,
the difficulties of determining additionality ex 
ante and particularly the possibility of project 
proponents to manipulate additionality testing 
have been a bone of contention for many CDM
stakeholders (e.g. Schneider 2009). Determining 
additionality in the CDM inherently requires a 
hypothetical scenario of what would have hap-
pened in the absence of the project and this
hypothetical scenario will always be open for 
manipulation, as it is impossible to proof. 
2.3 Commonalities and Differ-
ences 
The central difference between the two addi-
tionality concepts is the following: In the cli-
mate finance domain, additionality is related to 
donor countries’ political commitment to pro-
vide more financial resources. Measurement of 
additionality in this case is extremely problem-
atic due to the fuzziness of the baseline against 
which additionality is assessed.
In the CDM, on the other hand, additionality is
related to concrete GHG emissions at the pro-
ject level. Assessing additionality is a technical 
necessity to maintain the mechanism's envi-
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ty again is difficult, but at least an operationali-
zation was realized and it is now possible to de-
termine reasonably clearly the baseline against 
which additionality is assessed even if problems 
of credibility of the baseline remain. 
Both variations of the additionality concept 
have in common that „In both cases, additionali-
ty establishes a measure of seriousness, an indica-
tor of a real effort. The effectiveness of such efforts 
is measured against a counterfactual reference 
scenario or regulatory requirement. The counter-
factual nature of the concept makes it impossible 
to ever prove additionality. The testing of addi-
tionality generally involves the establishment of a 
baseline against which reality is gauged.” (Streck 
2011, p. 158f). 
The implications of this common core of the 
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3 System Integrity 
vs. Efficient Allocation
As described above, for the CDM additionality is
a central concept to ensure environmental in-
tegrity. Without provisions to ensure that pro-
jects are registered that represent real emission 
reductions is essential to maintain the balance 
of the “zero-sum-game” that the CDM is: certi-
fied emission reductions in developing coun-
tries entitle the owner of those certificates to 
emit one more tonne of CO2 under the capped 
environment. Without additionality, the CDM 
would degrade into a cheap buyout and effec-
tively deprive the Kyoto Protocol of any real
ambition to reduce emissions. 
This is different for the case of climate finance. 
The zero-sum-game of the CDM follows the 
Kyoto logic of a world divided in industrialized 
countries with binding mitigation obligations 
and developing countries without such obliga-
tions. This division, enshrined in the Conven-
tion’s annexes, has always been contentious.
Many have argued that the United States did 
not ratify the Kyoto Protocol because develop-
ing countries, in particular China, were not 
obliged to reduce emissions.
For the climate agreement to be agreed by the 
end of 2015 in Paris, the parties to the Conven-
tion have agreed that it shall be applicable to all 
and each and every country specify “intended 
nationally determined contributions”. It can 
thus be expected that in the future all countries 
will have some form of mitigation commitment 
whatever the differences in the content and the 
rigidity of these commitments may be. If, how-
ever, developing countries have themselves 
commitments, any certified emission reduction 
that allows to increase emissions elsewhere has 
an implication for the GHG inventory of the 
host country. A global climate treaty in which 
all countries take on some form of commitment 
erases the basis of the pure zero-sum-game 
that the CDM is based on.1 
More importantly, many mitigation activities 
proposed by developing countries will be con-
ditional on some form of technological and/or 
financial support. In other words, climate fi-
nance is directly bound to the various types of 
commitments developing countries propose.
Since the commitments, or rather contribu-
tions, will be put forward in the context of in-
ternational negotiations, it is hard to argue 
what part of the contribution is additional and 
what not. The act of Parties committing to the 
proposed contributions in the form of legal ob-
ligations is performative in that it defines these 
commitments as additional. In other words, by 
agreeing to commitments conditional to exter-
nal support in the context of international ne-
gotiations, these commitments are defined as 
additional per the agreement. In practice this is 
further complicated by the fact that domestic 
mitigation targets are often expressed in terms 
of percentage points below a baseline. This
leaves open the question, what parts of a miti-
gation action is additional and needs support 
and which part should be carried under the 
domestic target unconditionally.
 
1 There may remain room for a CDM-like crediting mecha-
nism under the new agreement, if some countries take on 
sectoral commitments or commitments to introduce cer-
tain polices and measures only. In this case, those sectors 
that are not directly affected or indirectly by the respective 
policy and measure may serve as a potential source for 
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Nevertheless, at the operational level, the 
CDM's additionality concept or a slightly revised 
variety thereof could serve as a criterion to pri-
oritize activities over others. As stated in the in-
troduction, international public climate finance 
will remain scarce. In the climate finance do-
main, an understanding of additionality of ac-
tions may help to allocate these resources effi-
ciently and thus maximize their effectiveness in 
terms of reducing emissions per funds availa-
ble. How this could be implemented in practice 
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4 The Limits of Additionality 
in Climate Finance
In this chapter, we will discuss some of the con-
ceptual problems arising if the CDM’s addition-
ality concept is transposed to the wider climate 
finance domain. The issues are arranged in no 
particular order.
4.1 The Problem of Attribution 
of Emission Reductions 
Developed countries that provide public funds 
in order to support mitigation activities in de-
veloping countries have a desire to clearly ac-
count for the amount of emissions that have 
been reduced. Typically, public funds have to 
be provided through annual public budgets.
Legislators will hold the executing bureaucra-
cies accountable for what has been achieved 
with the money provided in the last budget cy-
cle before agreeing to the next budget.
Hence, there is strong demand for a quantita-
tive evaluation of supported mitigation activi-
ties in developing countries. CDM projects pro-
vide a very clear cut ex-ante assessment of the 
expected impact in terms of emission reduc-
tions. However, if mitigation activities become
more complex, various activities synergistically 
target similar mitigation options and/or inter-
national climate finance covers only part of the 
total investments, it becomes much more diffi-
cult to directly link emission reductions to funds 
provided by developed countries.
Consider the following case: In order to increase 
the energy efficiency of the building sector, a 
country introduces a set of activities to promote 
energy efficiency retrofits of residential build-
ings:
•  an information campaign;
•  capacity building for architects, con-
struction companies, and local crafts-
men;
•  consultancy services for home owners;
•  special purpose low interest loans. 
Now consider the case of a home owner who in
the first place receives a leaflet of the infor-
mation campaign and starts thinking about ret-
rofitting his estate. He then makes an appoint-
ment at the local consultancy service and learns 
more about the special purpose loans and local
craftsmen that have been trained accordingly.
Finally, he applies for a low interest loan and 
contracts a specially-trained construction com-
pany to carry out the works.
It is impossible to attribute the emission reduc-
tions resulting from the improved energy effi-
ciency of the building to any one single activity.
In the described case, each and every compo-
nent was a necessary condition for achieving 
the emission reductions and none of the com-
ponents is sufficient in itself to induce the activ-
ity. If all of the above activities are integrated 
into one single programme and funded by one 
source of finance, attributing the emission re-
ductions achieved to every dollar spent on the 
programme may be feasible. This is, however,
not the case if the various components stand 
separately and are funded through a variety of



















Lukas Hermwille and Florian Mersmann 
The CDM’s additionality concept can aid in this
dilemma to some extent. Through determining 
a business-as-usual scenario, it defines which 
activities are necessary and sufficient to realize 
the emission reduction. Such an approach may 
be appealing for individual projects, but may be 
hard to maintain if the scope of the targeted ac-
tivities is expanded to entail economic sectors 
or even entire economies. It needs to be noted 
that determining additionality for entire sectors 
or even countries comes with a number of ca-
veats (cf. Sterk and Wittneben 2005).
4.2 Efficiency vs. Effectiveness? 
Proponents of the CDM’s additionality concept 
argue that it is key to ensure climate finance is 
allocated in an efficient way (Hermwille,
Wehnert and Sterk 2014). Indeed, the CDM has 
proven to be efficient in identifying low cost 
mitigation activities. However, this success 
builds on a relatively small number of different 
types of projects. Nearly half of the expected 
total Certified Emission Reductions generated 
under the CDM originate from hydro power or 
wind power projects. Other prolific project 
types include industrial gases (HFCs and N2O),
avoidance of GHG emissions other than CO2 
(coal bed/ mine methane, landfill gas, methane 
avoidance, fugitive), fossil fuel switch, energy 
efficiency measures (see figure 2).
All of these mitigation options produce rather 
immediate results and do not require a funda-
mental restructuring of physical infrastructures 
or consumption patterns. CDM-like additionali-
ty demonstration may thus be viable for pro-
jects that have a similarly short 'payback period' 
of funding vs. achieved GHG mitigation. 


















Landfill gas  
4.81%  
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6.64%methane  
5.95%  
Figure 2: Shares of total expected CERs by type of project. 
Source: UNEP DTU (as of February 2015). 
It may be very difficult to apply the same con-
cept to projects whose effects are expected to 
be much more long-term. More generally, it is 
doubtful whether activities aiming at structural
changes in infrastructure and the broader 
economy can be meaningfully measured in
terms of GHG emission reductions. The crux is
that there is most likely a long time gap be-
tween the initial activity and the realization of 
any emission reductions. This time gap, again, 
increases uncertainty for setting baselines and 
makes it very difficult to clearly attribute emis-
sion reductions to individual money invested.
A focus on short-term efficiency, if applied too
stringently, may impede mitigation activities 
that take effect only in the long term. But CDM-
like additionality may be efficient for types of 
mitigation activities that show more immediate 
results. Thus, the additionality concept can 
have a limited, but nevertheless important role 
to play for the efficient allocation in these kinds 
of projects. For activities aiming at long term 
and complex impacts, the CDM's additionality 
concept, at least in its current form, in our view
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4.3 Additionality and Trans-
formative Change 
The issue of scale has been touched upon in the 
preceding sections. The CDM was designed as a 
mechanism that covers individual projects 
within a wider economic sector. It was hoped 
that through positive experiences and the 
transfer of technological know how individual
projects would create positive spill-overs into 
the wider economy of the host country. Any-
how, no one expected the CDM to singlehand-
edly transform whole industrial sectors or even 
entire economies. Instead, various attempts 
have been made to increase the scale of the 
CDM including through the introduction of
programmes of activities (PoAs) and standard-
ized baselines (SBs). Ultimately, the New Market 
Mechanism that has been defined under UN-
FCCC also is the result of this exact desire.
Despite these developments, the CDM’s indi-
vidualistic and project-based approach con-
trasts with the requirement to fundamentally
restructure physical infrastructures in both de-
veloping and developed countries; to develop 
sustainable economic systems. This require-
ment is also reflected in the UNFCCC’s finance 
mechanism: For example, the Green Climate 
Fund has been given the mandate to promote a 
“paradigm shift” and has subsequently elabo-
rated a criterion to determine the paradigm
shift potential of proposed projects. It defines 
this paradigm shift as a shift to low-emission 
sustainable development pathways. (Green 
Climate Fund 2014; see also Hermwille, Ober-
gassel & Arens 2015).
The paradigm shift criterion, if considered rig-
orously, in a way is incompatible with the addi-
tionality criterion of the CDM. While additionali-
ty demonstration requires the determination of
a hypothetical business-as-usual scenario 
against which a proposed activity is assessed, 
the paradigm shift criterion requires to have a 
direct impact on what is business-as-usual.
Funded activities must demonstrate how they 
contribute to changing the state-of-the-art.
This argument may be illustrated by the discus-
sion of E+/E- policies in the CDM (see box be-
low). Since the CDM’s early days, it has been ar-
gued that the CDM could prevent countries 
from introducing climate friendly policies so as 
not to diminish their CDM potential. Climate 
National Policies and the CDM – The Issue of E+/E- Policies
There has been a lengthy discussion whether or not (new) national policies should be taken in-
to account in the development of the reference scenario of CDM projects. If a country intro-
duces a policy to reduce GHG emissions (E- Policy) this potentially reduces the potential to
generate CERs for a CDM project. It has been argued that the CDM would thus create a per-
verse incentive for countries not to introduce climate protection policies in order to protect
their CDM potential. Similarly, countries could introduce (or refuse to abolish) policies that in-
crease GHG emissions (E+ Policies; e.g. fossil fuel subsidies). On the other hand, not including
E+/E- policies could mean significant over crediting for some projects and thus a threat to the
environmental integrity of the CDM.
To avoid such perverse incentives, it is common practice in the CDM that E- policies do not
need to be taken into account if the respective policy was introduced after the adoption of the 
CDM Modalities and Procedures (November 2001). For E+ policies the cut off date is the adop-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol (December 1997).
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friendly policies can affect the viability of pro-
posed CDM projects in two ways. First, the poli-
cies can have an effect on the baseline emission 
scenario against which emission reductions are 
calculated. If the policy reduces the baseline 
emissions, this reduces the amount of CERs that 
can be generated and sold. Second, a policy can 
have an effect on the relative prices of compet-
ing technologies (e.g. through subsidies) and 
hence change the conditions for the invest-
ment analysis conducted as part of the addi-
tionality demonstration. 
This discussion illustrates the implications of
the additionality concept. The implications be-
come the more complex the more various poli-
cies interact. If the stated goal of international
climate finance is to induce a fundamental shift 
of entire economic infrastructures, it becomes 
nearly impossible to analytically separate the 
effects of the different instruments. It is there-
fore hard to imagine how to apply the CDM’s 
narrow additionality concept, if entire policies 
are to be funded instead of individual projects.  
4.4 Issues of Practical  
Applicability 
The tools for additionality demonstration that 
have been developed for the CDM may be diffi-
cult to be applied in practice. A central compo-
nent is investment analysis (see section 2 
above). However, if climate finance is employed 
to support the introduction of policies, it may 
be difficult to apply. Typically, when a policy is 
introduced, the cost of this policy is borne by 
the private sector (Okubo et al. 2011). Especially
for policies that create indirect incentives (e.g.
emissions trading) it is virtually impossible to 
calculate the investment cost ex-ante on an ag-
gregate level.
Also, it is hardly ever the case that a policy 
serves a single purpose only. It is at the core of 
democratic systems to negotiate and compro-
mise over policies. The result is typically that 
policies are designed to satisfy a wider range of 
interests. In fact, this is usually a good thing as 
policies that are built on various motivations 
have a higher likelihood of being implemented 
and maintained over a long period. Integrating 
policies to serve climate mitigation as well as 
wider sustainability objectives such as water 
and resource management, air pollution, pov-
erty alleviation, etc. is a promising strategy. 
However, such an integration of climate protec-
tion and wider sustainable development co-
benefits is to some extent at odds with a nar-
row interpretation of the additionality concept: 
one could argue that the more co-benefits mo-
tivate the introduction of a policy, the more 
likely it is that the policy would have been in-
troduced without explicit climate finance, i.e. it
is not additional. This may become problematic
if barrier analysis is applied to demonstrate ad-
ditionality of a proposed mitigation activity 
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5 Conclusions  
This policy brief started out with a brief review 
of the additionality concept as applied in the 
domains of CDM versus wider climate finance.
In the CDM, additionality is used to determine 
whether or not emission reductions claimed by 
a project would have occurred without the 
support of the mechanism. In climate finance,
additionality typically refers to the funding that 
is provided. The term “new and additional” cli-
mate finance is used to make sure that devel-
oped countries do not simply re-label estab-
lished official development aid. 
After clarifying the concept we discussed impli-
cations of the CDM's additionality concept.
Should it be applied also to wider climate fi-
nance? Can it contribute to allocating climate 
finance more efficiently? What are the implica-
tions for such an approach and what are its po-
tential limitations?
In section 3 we started our analysis by discuss-
ing the ends the additionality concept is meant 
to serve. In the CDM world, additionality is core 
to ensure environmental integrity of the mech-
anism. Only if CERs represent real emission re-
ductions, the zero-sum-game of the CDM plays 
out: CERs entitle the owner to emit extra CO2. If 
these CERs are, however, non-additional, the 
absolute amount of emission increases above 
the agreed level. 
For wider climate finance though, there ap-
pears no such strict need for additionality. Addi-
tionality can help to make sure that scarce fi-
nancial resources are allocated more efficiently,
to make sure that the maximum amount of 
emission reduction is being achieved with the 
available funding. 
•  Donor countries demand a high degree of 
accountability with regards to the funding 
provided. Can the additionality concept 
help to increase the transparency and ena-
ble such accountability? And to what ex-
tent? 
•  The CDM has been very successful in realiz-
ing low cost emission reductions. However,
it was most prolific in a very limited num-
ber of different project types only. Would a 
stringent application of the CDM’s addi-
tionality concept preclude important miti-
gation options, especially those that take 
effect only in the long term?
•  International climate finance is increasingly 
expected to not only support scattered 
and selective projects and activities, but to 
induce a “paradigm shift” towards sustain-
able development. How can the addition-
ality concept which crucially rests on the 
determination of a business-as-usual sce-
nario be reconciled with the aspiration to 
ultimately alter what is business-as-usual? 
•  Last but not least, we sketch some of the 
practical problems if the techniques for 
additionality demonstration that have 
been developed under the CDM are ap-
plied to approaches that go beyond indi-
vidual projects. How can an investment 
analysis be meaningfully executed if the 
cost of the introduction of a policy is dis-
tributed and born by the private sector? 
How can a barrier analysis be conducted if
policies serve multiple purposes and inte-
grate climate mitigation and wider sus-
tainable development objectives? 
Finally, we sketched out open questions with It is beyond the scope of this policy brief to give  
respect to the applicability of the additionality definitive answers to all these questions. In-













Lukas Hermwille and Florian Mersmann 
sions of the issue and provide a structure for 
the future debate. 
The questions laid out above demonstrate that 
it is impossible to apply the additionality con-
cept immediately and unmodified to the wider 
climate finance domain. Significant room for 
further research remains. Three of the most sa-
lient research questions are the following:
•  Within a portfolio of financially supported 
mitigation activities, for which types can a 
notion of additionality improve the effi-
ciency of the allocation of funds?
•  How can and should the tools of addition-
ality demonstration be modified to ac-
commodate the needs for mitigation activ-
ities that go beyond individual projects?
•  The CDM comprises a rich toolbox full of 
robust methodologies to measure, report 
and verify emission reductions. Under an 
alternative comprehension of additionality,
which of the methodologies may be help-
ful to improve the accountability of sup-
ported mitigation activities?
The CDM deserves merit for its success as the 
first and to date most successful mechanism to 
limit emissions on a global scale, and has broad 
potential to be further developed to account 
for future mitigation activities that do no longer 
constitute a zero-sum game. We firmly believe 
that its tools and methodologies can be used as 
a starting point to be adapted for the coming, 
globally inclusive climate regime. This paper 
provides a number of important questions on 
the limits, but also the potential of the CDM's 
additionality concept. We hope that it opens up 
room for researchers and practitioners to en-
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